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CORPORATE TAKEOVERS
A Recommendation for a California Policy
By Senator Dan McCorquodale

California Legislature
Senate· Commission on Corporate Governance
Shareholder Rights and Securities Transactions
March, 1988
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Senate Commission on Corporate Governance, Shareholder
Rights and Securities Transactions having studied the issue of corporate takeovers, submits the following conclusions and recommendations to the Legislature:
Conclusions:

•

A California corporate takeover law would be an ineffective
protection of corporations, workers and shareholders since it
would apply to a minimal number of corporations having business contacts in the State.

•

A national law requiring minimal standards of conduct for corporations, bidders and investors would reduce jurisdictional
competition and claims among states.

•

Without jurisdiction the Legislature cannot adequately address
and resolve conflicts between management and owners of corporations.

Recommendations:

•

The California Legislature should support federal preemption of
state takeover laws.

•

The California Legislature should support state legislative
proposals which will add to the protection of shareholders and
pension investments.

•

The California Legislature should support state legislative
proposals relating to takeover activities when there is a potential
for economic hardship to small corporations and their shareholders.

•

Problems associated with corporate takeovers such as depletion
of assets and resources, debt burdens to corporations and other
dislocations to the State's economy should be resolved as issues
separate from tender offer legislation.

Dan McCorquodale is Chairman of the Senate Commission on Corporate Governance, Shareholder Rights and Securities Transactions
and represents the San Jose and Modesto areas in the California legislature.

some form of legislation to restrict
'-""'""'" have restricted tender

takeover law will effect relatively few corporations,
chosen to incorporate in the State or have sufficient business contacts to come under the jurisdiction of the State's
Section 2115. A law will neither abet nor deter
The passage of takeover legislation at this
ineffective protection of shareholders, workers and
, as well as a deception of public policy .

. . . should be limited to takeover
infringe upon the appropriate
corporate governance and inter-

legislative proposals, the Senate CommisShareholder Rights and Securities
federal preemption of all states' laws relatactivities. The preemption as described by the
limited to takeover activities and not infringe
state interests of corporate governance and inter-

be drawn to separate internal management affairs
takeover issues of corporate control. In addiassociated with takeovers, such as plant closings
and resources, should be resolved as separate
diminish the seriousness of these issues or their
economy, resources and workers.

This recommendation is limited to federal preemption through amendment to the Williams Act, applicable to all corporations with a class
of equity securities registered under Section 12 or subject to Section
l5(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 for the following
standards:
(a) Voting rights based on percent of ownership;
(b) Voting rights based on duration of ownership;
(c) Poison pills;
(d) Second step "cash out" transactions;
(e) Greenmail;
(f) Prohibitions of equitable remedies;

(g) "Fair price" for cash out mergers;
(h) "Drop and sweep" purchases, and
(i) Disclosure rules for stating an intent to control a corporation.
The recommendation is not intended to be prescriptive. California
should have a voice in determining federal standards, but it is
presumptuous to assume the actions of Congress and contradictory to
circumscribe the rules for other states. Corporate takeovers are a national or perhaps, an international problem that cannot and should not
be resolved by fifty separate state laws.

3

2

LACK OF JURISDICTION
In most
of
preempted by other states, such as
virtue of a corporation havthe
to select a choice of law through incorporation. Even
if a corporation had a
of its property, payroll, sales, shareholder and its
located in California, it would not exclusively come under California laws should it choose to incorporate in
another state.
The

is that
the sixth largest economy
California can claim authority over only three Fortune
and less than four percent of New York Stock Excompanies. Corporate laws affecting Times-Mirror,
or Atlantic Richfield for example are made not in
Sacramento or
D.C., but in Dover, Delaware. The
merits of takeover legislation matter little, if California does not have
jurisdiction over corporations.

Despite having the sixth largest economy in the
world, California can claim authority over only
three Forture 500 companies.

It is also quite clear that California cannot enact corporation laws
even if
to do so. which
as attractive to
as the laws of Delaware or
states com-

It should

of Delaware's laws
In some instances such
the declaration of
dividends or valuation
Delaware law is
favorable to shareholders.
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However, California should not enter into a competition for incorporations which it cannot win without substantially redirecting state law.
The State should have the freedom to determine laws based upon economic, social, cultural and historical justification rather than a
response to coercive competition between states. Delaware as an example, has a free hand to enact corporate laws which have relatively
little effect on their own citizens except to provide additional revenue
in franchise taxes and a disproportional effect on otherstates ability to
regulate corporations.
As a small state with a modest economy, Delaware is the overwhelming choice of incorporation for corporations having their principal
business contacts in other states. In addition, Delaware courts have
established a body of case law unrivaled by other states. The incentives for Delaware incorporation are not likely to be reversed by the
passage of a California takeover law. A law which would likely
reverse past state pol icy.

Califorina Jaws do not protect Delaware
corporations.

Other states such as New York that have passed takeover laws with
less balance and equity than the Delaware takeover law at the behest
of their business lobbyists with such features as a five year prohibition on the divestiture of assets, lengthy disclosures and long tender
periods have not experienced a return of corporations from Delaware.
In most instances, state legislatures have reacted to the intimidation of
a single corporation's threat to leave for Delaware, by immediately
enacting protective legislation. This has been the case in Arizona
(Greyhound), Minnesota (Dayton-Hudson). New Jersey (Singer),
Washington (Boeing), and Ohio (Goodyear) to name just a few
examples.

5

The California Legislature, much to its credit, has resisted overreaction
despite takeover attempts on some of the major corporations in the state.
Perhaps that is due to a recognition of the inefficacy of a state takeover law.

Other states ... that have passed takeover laws ...
have not experienced a return of corporations from
Delaware.

Although California would like to provide a better business climate,
that goal is unlikely to be realized by legislation that has a narrow
application of relatively few corporations incorporated in California.
California laws do not protect Delaware corporations.
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CALIFORNIA ALTERNATIVES
California has three alternatives: (l) do nothing and continue to
abrogate authority over
corporations with substantial business
pass a takeover law which applies only to a relatively
or
assert jurisdiction through federal preemption
of state laws
virtue of its
representation. In light of
these facts, the best alternative is to attempt to assert jurisdiction
through federal preemption of state laws. Preemption would set a
floor for shareholder protections and a ceiling for management
prerogatives in the governance of corporations. States would be free
to set additional standards above the floor or below the ceiling. With
such a minimum federal
even set at a base approximating
existing Delaware law
is not being advocated), states would
be free to decide an appropriate standard for governance of corporations with the
that Delaware or some other state would not
continue the downward spiral of shareholder rights.
There is nothing
wrong with states having different standards
for corporate behavior. What is divisive is the competition to lower
standards in the "race to the bottom·'. Minimal federal preemptive
standards would establish a finish line for the race to the bottom.

Minimal federal standards would establish a
finish line in the race to the bottom.

of multi-state claims and disputes over
in state laws are
is not
to the states' rights claim
which was a
contention in the Indiana takeover case.
To the contrary, such
would promote states· rights. Differences in governance standards should reflect regional anomalies, not
""·'"''w'-''-" as the
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state entrepreneurialism. To restate the earlier question: Would
California be better served being preempted by Congress or preempted by the Delaware Legislature? The current system in which a post
office drop determines political and corporate behavior is totally irrational. It is an unimaginable metaphor for democracy.

Differences in governance standards should reflect
regional anomalies, not state entrepreneurialism.

What is a more reasonable alternative?
A federal takeover law recognizing two precepts:
(l) Regulation limited to the changes in corporate control.

Responsibilities for corporate law traditionally vested with states
should remain with states.
(2) Neutrality among shareholders and contending parties vying for
ownership as presumed by the Williams Act.
The purpose of any law should be to allow the shareholders to make
an informed decision regarding the ownership of a corporation free
from coercive offers from both bidders and management. With the
changes in ownership of corporations due to a shift of corporate equity to large pension funds perceptions of bias may have changed. This
is but another reason to reexamine federal Jaw.
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A FINAL PERSPECTIVE
California has been affected by the loss of jobs, resources and disruptions to the economy as much if not more than other states due to
corporate takeovers of the last few years. Some of this disruption can
be considered the price for the free movement of capital.

Number and Value of Mergers and Acquisitions, 1968-1986 a/
($ millions)
Average
Value

Year
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981

1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987 d/

:\umber of
Transactions

Total
Value

4,462
6,107
5,152
4,608
4,801
4,040
2,861
2,297
2,276
2,224
2,106
2,128
1,889
2,395
2,346
2.533
2.543
3,001
3,337

$43,609.0
23,710.9
16,414.9
12,619.3
16,680.5
16.664.5
12,465.6
11,796.4
20,029.5
21,937.1
34,180.4
43,535.1
44,345.7
82.617.6
53,754.5
73,080.5
122,223.7
179,767.5
173.300.0
93,100.0

927

Base bl
1,514
2,300
1,671
1,707
1,930
1,574
995
848
998
1,032
1,071
1,047
890
1,126
930
1,077

1,084
1,320
1,274
440

Current
Dollars

1982
Hollars cl

$28.8
10.3
9.8
7.4
8.6
10.6
12.5
13.9
20.1

$76.4
25.9
23.3
16.7
18.5
21.4
23.1
23.4
31.9
31.6
44.2
52.9
58.1
73.4
57.8
65.4
104.5
122.2
103.0
180.5

21.3

31.9
41.6
49.8
73.4
57.8
67.9
112.8
136.2
117.9
211.6

a; Reported transactions valued al $500,000 or more
bi The number of transactions for which the price \tas disdosed
c/ 1\leasured by the gross national product implicit price deflator
dl Figures as of June 1987
Source: W.T. Grimm & Co.
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Transa<.:tions
Valued at
Over
$100 Million

46
24
10
7
15
28
15
14
39
41
80
83
94
113

116
138
200
270
339
166

nia has

the state has long been a net importer of capital, Califorfrom a total increase in jobs and other benefits to the
economy. Some measures providing for the protection of
sudden economic adjustment are warranted, but
be ineffective if their application is limited to California
Protection of California's resources must apply to all
business in our state regardless of their charter.
uv'"""'" associated with takeovers are a result of
""'""'"'r and tactics in gaining or maintaining control
The State cannot correct problems of business
and often lacks the authority to restrain harmful tactics.

has been affected by the loss of jobs,
resources and disruptions to the economy as much
more than other states ...

should be to unveil the myth of legal control over
and restore
to California. That can only take
federal
Just as in the story of the Emperor's
Calitixnia bills itself as the sixth largest economy in
control over the governance of the largest corbusiness in the State. This recommendation should
nakedness of its authority and debunk the myth
and endorse federal preemption of state takeover
laws.
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THE GOVERNANCE COMMISSION
The California Senate created the Commission on Corporate Governance, Shareholder Rights and Securities Transactions in 1986 to
evaluate laws relating to and practices of corporate management, investment managers and investors, with particular concern to reconciling the need to establish stability for corporations operating in or
desiring to locate in California with the fiduciary obligations of investment managers and pension fund trustees to prudently invest
shareholder funds. The Commission's membership represents prominent members of the business, academic, investment and political
communities. The Commission sponsors legislation and its members
are often called upon for consultation or testimony on corporation and
securities law issues before the Legislature.
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